BBC Sources On The Arab World

 
Currently a range of valuable BBC sources can be found which deal with the Arab World. To start with, links to details about twelve Arab Nations can be found here . Furthermore, when accessing details on any of these specific nations a range of other links can also then be found.

Then here is this link to a BBC's item called the "Arab Spring : 10 unpredicted items". Each of these ten items then provide their own links, which themselves then lead on to extra items.

My own bits and pieces on the Middle East can be found via the labels shown below, although these are mainly related to items about Iraq. It was where I undertook my National Service in 1955/56. The experience and the events of that time helped to push me into politics.

The links I provide are as much for my own purposes as anything else. They will supplement my growing library on the Middle East. Its political complexities should be high on our agendas.  Perhaps the BBC will get round some day to giving an equally serious survey of British politics.

21 December - Now there is more, here.



  

A Reluctant Review

I am reluctant to review Mohsin Hamid's book "The Reluctant Fundamentalist". It is a short novel of under 45,000 words which many will devour at a single sitting. I wish to encourage others to read it, but it would be inappropriate for me to undermine that experience by analysing and therebye describing in detail what it is about or how the subject matter is handled. Yet it would be great to discuss this work with others who had already read it.

In my review of "The Islamist" by Ed Husain, I argued that people like myself who had been brought up to discuss ideas within the Western Political Tradition now needed quickly to get up to speed on a whole range of ideas and understandings within Islam. Mohsin Hamid shows what can happen to an intelligent and able young man with an Islamic background when he comes to absorb both the attractions and complexities of life in the West. It seems to me to provide understandings which help to put some of the tomes I have recently been studying into a clearer perspective.

If I encourage anyone to take up this book and they then come to judge that I have exaggerated my case, then at least I will feel justified in persuading them to have turned to what is by any standards a good read.

Understanding Pakistan And Its Neighbours

There is a valuable article about Musharraf's resignation as President of Pakistan in today's Daily Telegraph by the leading Pakistan journalist Ahmed Rashid (see photo). It is entitled "Masharraf leaves a fractured Pakistan". See here.

Ahmed Rashid is an expert on Central Asia and is well worth reading and listening to. The Institute of International Studies at the University of California, Berkeley have conducted two hour long interviews with him which are worth examining. The first took place on 26th March, 2002 and the latest on the 12th June this year. For the videos of these see here and here.

His latest telling book is currently on sale in major bookshops and is entitled "Descent Into Chaos ; How the war against Islamic extremism is being lost in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia" (Allen Lane, £25). See here.

His earlier books have all been well received. They are -

"The Resurgence of Central Asia : Islam or Nationalism" (1994) - here.

"Taliban : Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia" (2000) - here.

"Jihad : The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia" (2002) - here.

At the moment I am half way way down this list - the videos are the clinchers.

Baghdad's Socrates

Last-Of-Iraqis has surpassed even himself. First he posted a telling item about the horrors of the down side of life in Baghdad since the invasion. I covered this contribution under my heading "Baghdad's Picasso". Now he has posted a equally compelling item which reveals the hope that springs eternal in the hearts of the bulk of his fellow citizens, be they Sunni or Shia. His fine videos and photos of the recent Islamic festival at Adhamiya in Baghdad are only exceeded by his description of both the events and his feelings. People crowded into such enjoyable festive activities in Baghdad will surprise many.

The two posts by Last-of-Iraqis give us the down side of life in Baghdad as his initial thesis and then the up side as the following anti-thesis. I can't wait for him to draw his synthesis from what only the unthinking would judge to be conflicting items.

Khatami's Reformist Army?

Khatami was the President of Iran from 1997 to 2005. After an obligitary break, he is entitled to stand again for President. But will he? And what other feasible candidate could make the ballot paper and fly the reformist flag?

Now see the "Daily Telegraph" (of all papers)

In the run up to the Iran's problematic elections for their parliament, the Daily Telegraph have been producing a series of telling articles on the politics of Iran. In today's issue David Blair describes the economic difficulties faced by Iran's youthful population. He ends by speculating upon whether the reformist and former President Khatami will seek a come-back and stand for a third term of office in next year's Presidential elections.

Khatami was President between 1997 and 2005. Under the provisions of the Iranian Constitution he was not allowed to stand in 2005 against Ahmadinejad. I was surprised to discover that he is in fact eligible to stand again in 2009. But I now see from the wording of Article 114 of the Iranian Constitution that David Blair is correct. If Khatami can be persuaded to stand it will be a huge boost for the reformers camp in Iran, even if his subsequent policies are again frustrated by the ruling theocracy. For if he stands, it will give the Iranian people a meaningful election to look forward to and will stimulate social pressures for change by the reformists.

Article 114 states "The President is elected for a four-year term by the direct vote of the people. His re-election for a successive term is permissible only once."

I have now corrected my entry alongside Ahmaninejad's photograph here to take account of the fact that Khatami is eligible to stand in 2009.

The Shia Revival

THE SHIA REVIVAL : HOW CONFLICTS WITHIN ISLAM WILL SHAPE THE FUTURE by VALI NASR (W.W. Norton & Company, 2007 edition).

This book has a great deal going for it. To start with, the paperback edition which I bought at Waterstones is beautifully published and is a work which book lovers will enjoy handling. Then, the author, Vali Nasr has a compelling, readable and intelligent style. From the introduction onwards we come across memorable phrases, such as "(w)e live in an age of globalisation, but also of identity politics. It is as if the world is expanding and contracting at the same time."

Above all, the book has a compelling theme. It deals with the Shia of Islam, who account for some 10% of the world Muslims compared to the Sunni's 85%. But as the sub-title indicates we are at a cross-roads in history where the Shia are struggling for their place in the sun. Modern developments in Iran, Iraq and the Lebanon where the Shia have prominence, illustrate this.

Although Vali Nasr centres upon the above major trends amongst the Shia, he provides well crafted and helpful background details about Shia history and its wider international canvas. The significance of the festival of Ashoura is handled sympathetically and the spread and variety of Shia activities is shown to accommodate to (amongst others) Hindu practices in India.

Amongst the insights I gained about Shia politics was that they learnt lessons from the growth of the Iraqi Communist Party which had reached its peak in 1959. The bulk of the labourers who moved into work in the oil industry, Baghdad's factories and Basra's port were Shia. An appeal to their class interests and help for them via Shia social services became part of the religious communities conventional wisdom.

The author takes the side of the moderate, quietest and reflective Shia tradition, rather than of the revolutionary, terrorist and totalitarian tradition. So Sistani's advocacy of the power of the franchise in Iraq (then elsewhere) to extend the Shia's political influence is seen as the big hope for peace and prosperity. He looks to this as an avenue to counter the impact of the Khomeini revolution in Iran. If the only solution is to take sides in this internal Shia debate, then it is (of course) the correct side.

Unfortunately as the book progresses, the author's hopes for the Sistani transformation seem to me to falter in two respects.

First, Vali Nasr sees the Shia's struggle for political space as mainly being directed against Sunni influences. So Sunni politics is presented as being one-sided and oppressive, whether it operates under secular Arab leaders or via bodies such as Al-Qeada. The Sunni are never shown to have their own quietest or democratic-leaning side. Yet whilst Sistani was active from the south of Iraq, Jamal Abul Karim al-Dabban was the senior Sunni religious leader in Tikrit from 2004 until his death in 2007. He was considered to be a moderate. (The nearest Vali Nasr gets to sympathy for the politics of the Sunni camp is his admiration for the influence of King Faysal of Saudi Arabia before his death in 1975.)

Secondly when the first edition of this book was published in 2006, it left us with high hopes for coming Shia democratic and civic practices. However, by the second edition arrived in 2007, the author had to accommodate his views to the seriously deteriorating security position which arose across Iraq following the destruction of the Shia Mosque at Samarra. So he produced an "Afterword" which finds Sistani retreating to his tent to concentrate on religious texts, whilst Sunni-Shia sectarianism bounds forth. If matters have improved somewhat recently (with the tactics around the US surge), they have not yet put Vali Nasr's initial high hopes back on track.

There are only just over 250 pages of text in the book and the two problems I have listed above did not come to my attention until I reached the final 50 pages. In the meantime, Vali Nasr work impressed as a readable and worthwhile introduction to an essential topic which otherwise would be difficult to grasp. For once, I read a book mainly about the Middle East where I didn't become confused by names of the secondary characters, for each argument and analysis fitted into the books overall framework. It was only in the "Afterword" that the author was forced into a fresh situation. It was at least good to see that he did not duck from this task.

Shia Delight

To get a feeling of why the Shia risk life and limb to make the pilgrimage to Karbala in Iraq (often from Iran) see this 15 minute video. Unfortunately, I am unable to follow the sub-titles or the words that are sung. But I still find it moving (although I am an atheist). I gained access to this via Iraqi Mojo's blog.

Factors Shaping Politics : Part 4 Of "Understanding Iran"

When they are free to do so, Iranians who oppose the current regime but don't wish to be associated with the symbolism of the previous Shah, opt for this earlier Civic Flag in place of the current State Flag which appears below. (H.B. 13.4.08)

Part 1 of this series on "Understanding Iran" appears here, with Part 2 here and Part 3 here.

The strength of national sentiment is one of the factors which shape Iranian Politics. But there is also a complex interplay of other factors at work.



(1) Nationalism

Iran has experienced three major shifts in its overall political make-up since the end of the Second World War. These occurred (1) under Mohammed Mossadeq's democratic premiership (1951-53), (2) under the Shah's dictatorship (1953-79) and (3) from the time of the Islamic revolution in 1979. Although the nation's politics have lurched dramatically in differing directions with each of these shifts, the bulk of the Iranian population have always shown a strong sense of national identity. This arises from their long history and their long term coherence as a single unit. The most recent exception to their operating in a common structure goes back to the relatively short-lived consequences of the Anglo-Russian invasion during the second world war, which produced foreign controls and a split in the administration of the nation.

Further factors adding to this sense of national identity is the size of Iran and what it perceives to be its status in its region. It has not seen the break-ups and re-alignment of some of its neighbours and has held a strategic position as the only nation on the eastern bank of what it calls the "Persian Gulf". On the other hand the remaining bank is currently shared out between seven different nations. The Gulf itself also having the presence of the US fleet.

The next two factors, also add to Iran's sense of national identity.

(2) Shia Islam

98% of Iran's population are Muslims, with 89% being Shia. Given Iran's size, coherence and status as an Islamic Republic, this makes it the world leader of the Shia version of Islam. The only potential rivals to this position are the Shia of Iraq. The territory dominated by the Iraqi Shia contains most of the Holy centres of this faith. However, the Shia of Iraq have just recently emerged from under the totalitarian dictatorship of Saddam Hussein. They operate inside a nation in turmoil, in which their fellow believers in Iran play a role which is seen by some as supportive and others as interference. Indeed it is only just over a quarter of a century since Saddam Hussein launched an attack on Iran which led to a hideous eight year conflict between the two nations and between the two Shia camps. All of these factors help to keep Iran and not Iraq, at the forefront of the Shia world.

The majority of Iran's Shia clerics come from mainly urban petite bourgeoise families, but they are also widespread throughout society and tend to retain close links with people from their own backgrounds - which include the working classes.

(3) Anti-Imperialism

In 1953, the US Central Intelligence Agency played a major role in restoring the Shah to power. The Shah ran an oppressive regime which was backed by the US and other Western powers. When the Shah attempted to modernise and westernise Iran, he did this in a highly oppressive and exploitive way which included the use of a hated secret police force.

Further aspects of the conflict between the USA and Iran will be examined later. But from the Shah's period it has always been possible for Islamic forces (in particular) within Iran to spread the notions that liberal values from the West are invariably intermingled with forms of decadence and exploitation. What the USA, in particular, sees as forms of liberty are often seen by Islamic peoples as being mere licence and immoral excess.

It needs to be remembered, however, that when it comes to issues such as the way women dress and whether they should have open access to the same life-style as men, then anyone in Iran who is in their mid-40s or over will have experienced the norms of a more Westernised (but corrupt) regime. As Iran is a young population, this is a minority of the population. On the other hand, younger people with middle class lifestyles face the excitements of an illicit Western culture. There is, for instances, a high number of Iranian bloggers and a current dispute over how their activities should and can be subject to control. So whilst Iranians tend to share strong anti-Imperialist feelings, for many this does not spill over into say a full grown anti-Americanism.

(4) Diversity

It isn't inevitable that the above factors of Nationalism, Shia Islam and Anti-Imperialism will lead to a monolithic society; for different people will give different weights and interpretations to each factor. On top of this there are numbers of divisions within Iranian society which persist and challenge tendancies towards a uniform outlook on life. Such divisions will not necessarily lead to splintering. In favourable circumstances they could aid democratic and pluralist developments.

(a) CLASS DIVISIONS

Class divisions are significant in any society. Iran is highly urbanised and has seen the growth of industrial working class occupations. Although this social class draws down from the influences mentioned above, it it can also be attracted towards collective action in pursuit of its common interests. In the past there was clear influence from the Communist-inspired Tudeh Party under the impact of the former Soviet Union which rested on Iran's northern border. Today there are also struggles to organise Trade Unions amongst groups such as the Tehran bus drivers. There is also a high level of graduate unemployment which can act as a recruiting ground for liberal and socialist understandings. Some of the latter move out and back into Iran and help to cross fertilise ideas.

The pull of the views of the Islamic clerics from the time of the events leading up to the Islamic Revolution has been strong amongst the poorer sections of this working class. Numbers of these have moved from agricultural areas and send remittances home to their families who often still live in rural areas.

The growth of the towns has also led to a growth of Bazaars. Those running businesses in these (often with extended family links) plus employees making the goods they sell, have been amongst the stongest supporters and publicists of the norms of the Islamic Revolution.

There is also a class with business, management, professional and financial skills in a mixed economy with a wide area of State, co-operative and foundation structures. Numbers of these have clerical connections and all tend to share concerns to preserve and advance their interests - however, some will seek to do this via more radical avenues then others.

(b) ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS DIFFERENCES

Iran contains numbers of minority ethnic and religious groups. Such divisions are mellowed by inter-marriages and the unifying factors mentioned in sections (1), (2) and (3)above. Divisions can come to the fore, however, in periods of tension such as that of the Revolution itself - for it wasn't clear at the time that the forces around the Khomeini would truimph.

The largest ethnic minority are the Azeriz and since the collapse of the Soviet Union there has been the pull of a neighbouring independent Azerbaijan on part of Iran's northern border. Other groups include Kurds, Arabs, Baluchis and Turkmen (with now a neighbouring Turkmenistan). Whilst inter-ethnic relations tend to be reasonably amicable, outside events in neighbouring countries (such as the move to relative autonomy by the Kurds in Northern Iraq) can have an impact on attitudes amongst their related ethnic minorities in Iran.

On religion, the only sizeable minority are the Sunni, who are also strong amongst the Kurds. Developments in Iraq can influence the Sunni of Iran in contrasting ways to their impact on the majority Shia.

(c) GENDER DISTINCTIONS

Whilst the role of women is seriously restricted by the practices of the Islamic Republic, a number of countervailing factors also need to be considered.

Women have the vote, widespread access to some genuine education and improving health facilities. They played prominent roles in the Islamic Revolution and during the Iraq-Iran War which enhanced their status within what was otherwise an alien setting.

The legal, practical and social restrictions upon women in Iran cannot be ignored. But if other forces begin to work upon their husbands and sons to achieve democratic, libetarian and social advances: then women are liable to be able to press more effectively for their own improvements. The struggle for advancement can then (in numbers of areas) cross the gender divide.

Female undergraduates outnumber males and are often restricted to jobs openings in the teaching profession. It is, however, a key avenue for those wishing to open up the minds of future generations. At the moment the franchise might have its limitations, but it also provides votes from 15 for all - including those taught by female graduates.

Those in Iran who press for civil rights for women, trade unionists, homesexuals, reformers, minority interests and others can benefit from outside pressures organised by groups such as Amnesty. Here is an example.

Democratic Sham? : Part 3 of "Understanding Iran"

Part 1 of this series on "Understanding Iran" appears here. Part 2 is here.


Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the President of Iran was elected in 2005 for a four-year term of office on a universal franchise of the residents of Iran (male and female). A President can only serve for one set of successive terms. But this provision appears to allow a President who has already served an eight year period to serve more terms as long as these are not successive.

The Majilis, Iran's parliament of 290 members are also elected on a universal franchise. Elections are currently pending. There is also a wide range of elections for Local and Town Councils under the same form of franchise.

BUT - there are a series of controls and restraints upon the above operations, which undermine the democratic credentials of the Iranian constitutional and political system. These are covered next.

The Democratic Deficit

This arises from Iran being an Islamic Republic with strong theocratic controls.

(1) The Supreme Leader And The Assembly Of Experts: It isn't the elected President in association with the Majilis who has the final say within the Iranian system. This position is held by the Supreme Leader. Currently this is Atytollah Khamanei. He was elected for life in 1989 by the Assembly of Experts, who consist of 86 Mullahs and are the only body who can intervene to replace the Supreme Leader. The Supreme Leader is commander-in-chief and appoints the heads of the judicary, the police, the military and the State radio. He also operates overall supervision under the provisions of the Constitution.

(2) The Guardians Of The Constitution: The Assembly of Experts are themselves an elected body, but the whole of the electoral system (including elections of the President and the Majilis) is subject to a significant power of veto by a body called "The Guardians of the Constitution". This is made up of twelve jurists. Six have specialisms in Islam and are appointed by the Supreme Leader, whilst another six are jurists whose names are put forward by the Head of the Judiciary (who is himself appointed by the Supreme Leader) and are then elected by the Majilis. The Guardians are ruling out a whole host of candidates at the moment who had intended to stand in the General Election for the Majilis. In 2004, some 2,000 such candidates were excluded. Those barred from standing are mainly radicals who wish to see reforms within the political system and are more likely to be supporters of progressive social reforms. The Guardians also supervise the operations of elections. This gives them openings to further interfere in the electoral process.

(3) Presidential Powers Over The Majilis: Although the President's grant of power under the Constitution is secondary to that of Supreme Leader, he still has a position of significance in that he (a) appoints the Heads of a wide range of posts and Ministries outside of those controlled by the Supreme Leader and (b) can block legislation passed by the Majilis. Although there has been a recent case in which the Supreme Leader has acted to override such a Presidential veto.

(4) Loss Of Civil Liberties: For democracy to flourish, there is the need for a wide range of freedoms (a) to express conflicting viewpoints, (b) to enable people to organise into competing political parties and pressure groups and (c) to be able to demonstrate peacefully for their concerns. Iran has a poor record in these areas and the situation is currently worsening. Human Rights Watch covers the situation in Iran on pages 472 to 477 of its "2008 World Report". It set the scene with the following comments - "Respect for basic human rights in Iran, especially freedom of expression and assembly, continued to deteriorate in 2007. The government of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad routinely detains people for peacefully exercising their rights to freedom of expression and association, and regularly tortures and mistreats those detained. The judiciary, which is accountable to the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, is responsible for many serious human rights violations. The government increasingly cites "national security" as a prexext for silencing expressions of dissent or calls for reform."

(5) Extra Restrictions On Women's Rights: Although women have the vote and a small number have been elected to the Majilis, they are excluded from seeking the offices of Supreme Leader, President or membership of the theocratic bodies mentioned above. They are also invariably barred from associating with men in large groups, whether this on demonstations or in attending football matches.

The Dichotomy At The Heart Of The Iranian System

The Iranian Constitution attempts to marry together a system of regular and universal voting, with theocratic controls. This is an arrangement which can only work smoothly when the bulk of the electorate find themselves in conformity with the norms and values of their religious leadership. When wide groups feel economically deprived and Iran's young population throws up student groups with radical viewpoints and global pressures import values of free association; then social tensions are likely to advance. Pressures can then emerge to improve the democratic arrangements and to try to use them to usher in social change. Whilst some elements of the clerical and economic elites may then seek to compromise with such pressures, others will be given to using and extending theocratic controls. Such tensions could arise, especially, around a future Presidential election and over whom is entitled to stand. As indicated in Part 2, there is also a strong sense of national indentity throughout Iran. When the country is under pressure (as in the Iraq-Iran War) such nationalism can be mobilised for internal political ends as it was by theocratic elements in the 1980s. This is relevant to the conflict between the USA and Iran, which we will examine in a later section.

A Move To Shia-Sunni Unity In Iraq

Iraqi Mojo reports on this move.

Given the significance of religion in Iraqi politics, lets hope it is as significant as the Ian Paisley/Gerry Adams deal in Northern Ireland.

P.S. In time the hard line Shia and the hard line Sunnis might become the Iraqi Chuckle Brothers, just like these Northern Island counterparts.

P.P.S. If only Maqtada Sadr would learn to chuckle kindly.

Can International Islam Resolve The Dilemma of Iraq?

The Badr Brigade and the Mehdi Army have been major disruptive forces based in the Shia areas of Iraq. They cover some 65,000 combatants and have directed themselves against (a) Coalition Forces, (b) the Sunni (especially those elements who are themselves organised into a variety of competing terrorists groups), and (c) each other. They have also infiltrated the Iraqi administration and what should be its forces of law and order.

The religious leader of the Shia in Iraq is the Grand Ayatollah Al al-Sistani. He has often seemed to be a respected figure in the background as the men of violence gained our attention. But there are periods at which his position comes very much to the fore. This started soon after the invasion when he issued a fatwa against Bremer's proposals to have the Iraqi Constitution written by outsiders. He stressed the need to transfer power to Iraqis as soon as possible.

He has now made a welcome appeal to Shiite tribal leaders to leave aside their divisions with the Sunni. His voice is widely revered.

Furthermore Shiite and Sunni tribal chiefs are said to be pondering the possibility of forming an alliance against terrorism around the 10 point "Mecca Document" which has emerged from the Organisation of the Islamic Conference which represents all 57 Islamic Nations. I have stressed this body's potential in the recent past.

The Mecca Document also has the approval of Sistani. He has also today had a significant meeting with the Sunni Vice-President of Iraq.

It would be quite something if it was International Islam who made the major move to give the Iraqi people the decent future they need.

Great Minds Think Alike.....and?

In the threads here and here, I develop the argument for replacing the present Coalition forces in Iraq with troops from Islamic Nations other than those bordering Iraq. Just after I answered a recent comment on the second thread above, I turned to Johann Hari's web-site to see him propounding a similar viewpoint. He shows that in a terrible and dangerous Iraqi situation, the suggestion is no easy option. But it is probably the only hope we have left.

Moqtada al-Sadr and Me

In a debate in a thread at "Harry's Place" I was challenged to explain my position in relation to the existence of foreign troops in Iraq. I responded with an argument which I later gave the following title -

PRIVATE AND COALITION TROOPS OUT, ISLAMIC TROOPS IN

My case ran as follows, although it was later elaborated upon in the thread -

(1) Coalition forces in Iraq operate a very mixed role. They stimulate opposition, yet offer some sort of protection against terrorism. They could be replaced by troops from Islamic nations (other than from nations bordering Iraq). The wealthier nations in say the G8, would need to provide the funding via the United Nations - so US money would need to be forthcoming, whilst looking for ways in which the piper did not play the tune. The Iraqi Parliament would need to accept this alternative. For whilst the Iraqis did not ask us to invade them, they should have the say over the terms of our removal.
(2) There is also a need to remove the 2nd largest foreign force in Iraq. These are mercenaries provided by private security firms. These could be removed at the same time as the Coalition troops. In the meanwhile urgent action needs to be taken by the UK and other Governments (along with Iraq's) to control the operations of firms which are subject to their authority.

Now I find that Moqtada al-Sadr (of all people) is seemingly coming up with something similar. It is time for some serious discussion and bargaining to take place.

Political Islamism v Spiritual Islam

The Need To Study Islam

Sometimes old dogs need to learn new tricks.

I have studied, taught and practiced politics for over half a century. Arab and Islamic issues have at times dominated my perceptions, from the Suez Crisis in 1956 to the current situation in Iraq. Yet inevitably I have viewed such events through the prism of the Western Political Tradition. So the concepts I have invariably used as critical tools have tended to be those of Capitalism, Socialism, Democracy, Social Justice, Fascism and Totalitarianism.

I am not for ditching my basic approach, but I feel a need to try and grasp hold of more of Islam from inside its own tradition. This seems to me to be possible without descending into a form of cultural relativism, which can ditch a belief in basic democratic values.

A practical difficulty in studying Islam is that it is dominated by, to me, difficult Arabic names and concepts. Whilst my experiences as an MP were also limited by the fact that the Constituency I represented has one of the smallest ethnic minority populations of any in Britain. Although it was Constituency casework that pulled me into taking a long term interest in developments in Pakistan.

Where To Start

It is by no means the first book I have read on Islam, but what I feel may be an invaluable feed into the area I am looking for is Ed Husain's recent book
"The Islamist".

The author effectively describes his own move into the world of Political Islamism. His route (away from traditionalist family Islamic influences) is via the Young Muslim Organisation and then Hizb iu-Tahrir. This is a complex world for the outsider and has characteristics of the divided world of Trotskyism which held its fascinations in the era of the Miltant Tendency. It is, however, a more dangerous world, opening up to anti-semitism, homophobia, the domination of women and suicide bombing. It is Ed Husain's personal story which helps the reader to put all these bits and pieces into a clear focus.

Breaking Free

A dramatic incident shakes the writer's commitment to the cause he had played a leading role in. But it takes him time (and counter-experiences) to be able to move firmly onto the alternative ground which he calls "Spiritual Islam".

Whilst his shift is essentially back to the ground his parents stood upon, his personal understanding of his move is given depth by the fact that he has travelled such a complex ideological journey. This is all conveyed meaningfully to the reader.

Towards the end of the book he draws us into key experiences he has in Syria and Saudi Arabia. The former are mainly positive experiences and the latter entirely negative ones. What he says on Syria may pleasantly surprise some.

What is missing?

Ed Husain refers to interesting sounding literature from the camps he moves between. Some of which I will seek to follow up. Unfortunately, his own book lacks some useful technical data. There is no index, no regular footnotes for the references he makes and no reading list drawn from his many references. So I will have to go back to the book to dig out what I need.

There is something even more important that is missing. Whilst we can follow the influences that move him between different interpretations of Islam, he does not provide his intellectual justifications for having a belief in the very existence of Allah.

I find this to be a vacuum as I have also have had an interest in philosophy as well as politics over the past 50 years. As an gentle atheist, this includes an interest in Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Religion. Although again, my approach is dominated by approaches within the Western Philosophical Tradition. Perhaps Ed Husain could think about writing a follow-up book that would cater for such interests. But with an index and proper references please.

Shaking Up What's Left

A review of Nick Cohen’s “What’s Left? How Liberals Lost Their Way” (Fourth Estate, 2007.)

Love it or hate it, this is a readable and serious political romp.

Nick Cohen wishes to shake up wide elements of left and liberal opinion whom he feels can’t see some clear home truths about terrorist, nihilist, totalitarian, criminal and fascist activities in the modern world.

When a writer is driven by such a passion, they are liable to look for evidence and arguments that will tug at the heart strings. It is this very passion which explains both the strengths and weaknesses of this book
.
Post Modern and Anti-Imperialist Blunders

The author is not claiming that the Bush administration, with support from Tony Blair has been spotless in its moves to police sections of the world. But he is highly critical of those who condemn the Bush-Blair Axis and then go on to “understand”, excuse or even endorse the acts of Muslim extremists and others - including those of the late and unlamented Milosevic.

Nick Cohen believes that such errors of judgement are widespread and arise from two major factors.

First, many on the Left see what they term as forms of Western Imperialism as merely reaping what they have sown in countries such as Iraq. The plight of the Iraqi people under attack from criminals, sectarians, religious bigots and people with wild international agendas are then written off as only having been created by the forces which invaded that country.

Secondly, post-modern viewpoints of an avant-garde nature on cultural relativism have led many to excuse Non-Western excesses against homosexuals and women as just being part of alternative and distinctive cultures. Monstrous actions are then accepted as being essential parts of such life styles. It is then believed that we have no right to criticize what our own mind-sets can’t comprehend.

Nick’s Pickings

I have a great deal of sympathy for Nick Cohen’s negative thesis. He targets many who often make me moan and groan; including Noam Chomsky, Michael Moore, Robert Frisk and the leadership of the Stop the War Coalition.

Yet like an old fashioned “balanced” Manchester Guardian editorial, I nevertheless feel that some of the above do come up with criticisms of Western excesses which we do at times need to take on board. Although I also recognise that the modern-day Guardian also fits well into the camp that is under criticism.

One of my main concerns is the way that Nick Cohen builds up his case. He is in danger of constructing a counter-mythology of his own. Even though he recognises the excesses of Guantanamo Bay and Al Ghraib, pressures for Oil privatisation and many other Western style failures and abuses; his criticisms are only made in passing and merely give the appearance of statutory condemnations made to protect his back.

Vigour Instead of Rigour

His arguments often lack rigour. He uses what he feels will best hit the emotions and create the mood he is seeking. Plays, poems, psychiatric experiments and hoaxes are all drawn upon.

The socialist shortcomings of Stalin, George Bernard Shaw, HG Wells and Virginia Woolf (“a pacifist and screaming snob”) are delved into to show that some elements of the left have always been liable to flip over to elitist, dictatorial and totalitarian extremes.

When he moves on to tackle the more modern nonsenses which have arisen within socialism, he provides racy tales about the follies of Tony Cliff, Ted Grant and Tariq Ali. But there is no mention of any figures over the past 20 years on what is left of Labour’s hard left. The Bennite past remarkably does not get a single look in.

He concentrates instead upon the living-dead of recent socialism - trotskyists and troglodytes such as Gerry Healy.

Genesis Of the Present Dilemma

To Nick Cohen, the modern dilemma for left liberal opinion started under Major’s Conservative Government when it failed to move to defend Bosnians from acts of Serbian paramilitary genocide ( which the International Courts have just accepted was at least aided by deliberate inactivity from Belgrade, although the guilt goes much deeper than sins of omission.)

The Conservative acts of appeasement provided no counterpoint to a growth of sympathy on the left for Milosevic, which was motivated by a concern not to see the continuing break-up of the former Communist Yugoslavia.

When a Labour Government finally joined moves to protect Kosovo Albanians fleeing from Serb forces in 1999, many of the Left opposed the move pointing to the bombing of civilians which NATO undertook in and around Belgrade.

It seemed to me that there were two sides to the coin. We could and should have acted in defence of Bosnia (and even earlier still to counter the ethic battles which raged between the Serbs and Croats.) Yet much of the eventual bombardment from the air hit civilian areas with the military only experiencing the collateral damage. This is a continuing problem with Western-led military action.

We need the development of alternative means of anti-insurgency, drawing upon those we move to protect. We should no longer act as if we were involved in a hot version of the Cold War.

Whose Side Are We On ?

Nick Cohen’s position on Bosnia is important in showing that his condemnation of extremism in the Muslim world isn’t part of a general anti-Muslim stance. For Muslims were prominent in what had been a fairly integrated Bosnian Society.

Under the stimulus of Al-Qaeda’s destruction of the Twin Towers, he next supported military action in Afghanistan which also had the key justification of seeking to overturn the Taliban’s marriage of modern totalitarianism techniques with medieval reaction.

I again went along with this stance, but I was still a continual critic of the inappropriate methods of US led warfare and their occupational techniques.

Whilst Nick Cohen is in no doubt that the Gulf War and the invasion of Iraq were fully justified to tackle Saddam Hussein’s expansionism and his genocide against wide categories of his own people, he displays an ambiguity towards those of us who warned against invasion because of its destabilising consequences but immediately after the event moved to support Iraq’s own complex forces of democracy and pressed for the tackling of terrorism.

We are guilty of marching with the Stop the War Coalition in that mass demonstration, but we are then patted on the head for our subsequent stance. On the latter, we are at least seen to be acting in the best traditions of the old left in the Trade Unions and in the Parliamentary Labour Party.

Indeed, he goes as far as to dedicate his book to the late Hadi Saleh, the Iraqi Trade Union leader who was brutally murdered by terrorists in Baghdad in 2005. Yet Hadi (whose meetings I chaired in the Commons) had been an opponent of the invasion, although as soon as it took place he returned to his homeland and become an activist and organiser for furthering trade unionism and democracy inside Iraq.

I have always argued that Hadi’s opposition to the invasion and the use he then made of the new openings it provided, were both correct positions. Although I grant that those of us who opposed the invasion were under an obligation to say what alternatives we sought in order to end Saddam’s reign of terror. This always seemed to me to involve support for the very type of clandestine activity which Hadi and his comrades were involved in. With practical acts of solidarity from outside of Iraq this could have opened the way for progressive Iraqi forces themselves to have instigated regime change.

On The Zionist Question

In dealing with the general situation in the Middle East, Nick Cohen adopts a strong position for the defence of Israel, whilst arguing that a solution of the Palestinian conflict requires a confrontation with both Jewish and Muslim ultras.

There is then a strong criticism of those liberals who camouflage forms of anti-Semitism under a cloak of anti-Zionism.

Here it seems to me that it is fruitful for the left to avoid such dangers by clarifying what we understand by the use of the concept of “anti-Zionism”. For it is possible to adopt forms of Zionism and anti-Zionism at the same time.

Zionism was initially a movement to establish a Jewish State in Palestine. With the establishment of a State of Israel with its widely recognised borders and its theoretical rights for its Arab citizens as embodied in its Constitution, a major element of the initial project has been achieved.

Without recognising the rights of settlements on the West Bank nor of Israel’s freedom to act at will in Gaza and the Lebanon, those of us who recognise the right of Israel to exist and to take reasonable action to defend itself have, in fact, come to accept a partial Zionist position.

Many of us have not done this from ideological positions, but mainly as a matter of coming to terms with what we saw as the politics of the situation. Although those of us who were young children at the time of the holocaust, may have developed Jewish sympathies which gave little consideration at the time to the Arab Question.

On Zionism, we need to be clear that we are opposed to its expansionist form and to any desire to treat Arabs as second class citizens.

Many anti-Zionists obscure the distinction I have made. Their ill defined form of anti-Zionism allows them to gain the acceptance of those who wish to destroy the State of Israel, whilst telling the rest of us that they aren’t anti-Semitic as they actually favour a two State solution to the Palestine problem.

Clarity on what we mean by anti-Zionism might not be everything, but it sure is an important starter.

But whilst we have a three card trick being played by some to obscure the distinctions we need to have in our mind between Anti-Zionism and Anti-Semitism, Zionist lobbies (of both the types I describe) can also be used to hide counter criticism of un-praiseworthy acts by Israel or its supporters. We should avoid being fooled by the language tricks on both sides of this divide.

Walking and Chewing Gum

Nick Cohen’s achievement is to alert us to the very real dangers of the contemporary evils I listed earlier, including totalitarianism. Although he needs to recognise that these will not always be experienced in their absolutists forms. As Mary Kaldor has pointed out in relation to Iraq “by spring 2003 the regime exhibited characteristics that are typical of the last phase of totalitarianism - a system that is breaking up under the impact of globalisation, unable to sustain its closed, autarchic, tightly-controlled character” (Iraq: the wrong war, 21.4.05, Open Democracy web-site.)

There is, however, an urgent need to contain, push back and end the forms of development which concern Nick Cohen. It is, of course, difficult to achieve his aims without the involvement of the world’s major economic, cultural and political power - the USA. After all without our moral support, they will still either automatically intervene in some form or they will go into an even more dangerous form of isolation. We need to acknowledge this, yet seek to significantly influence their role.

Democratisation at the level of the world’s major institutions, within the USA and in bodies such as the European Union or within ad hoc cosmopolitan groupings, is an essential. It is needed to direct these structures towards only justifiable interventions which are directed towards worthwhile ends and which ensure the use of the best available humanitarian methods.

The democratic taming and revitalisation of such power structures is part of the very means by which we make it easier to make the world and its peoples safe from the forces which Nick Cohen wishes us to face up to.

Even though hard choices have to be made in situations of crisis, we can’t always easily choose between Imperialism on the one hand and Fascism on the other. We will often need to tackle both at once as we learn to “walk and chew gum at the same time” - to use a phase employed by Nick Cohen. George Orwell used to understand this.

In The Meantime

I appreciate that we can’t wait for improved forms of democracy, before we next act to protect ourselves and others. Although each crisis does offer a democratic opportunity of its own - like the world-wide marches against the invasion of Iraq, whose main humanitarian drive Nick Cohen fails to understand.

Whilst we wait for a full democratic break-through, we have no option but to decide how to deal with passing problems according to the complexities of each set of circumstances. So despite serious problems, I am solidly opposed to an attack on Iran.

But that doesn’t mean that my thought processes fit in with those of Andrew Murray or George Galloway. For the Iranian regime needs working upon (being pulled into discussions, for instance) to move it away from its own development of nuclear weapons and its Shia expansionist instincts.

I also realise that in politics, we often are pressed into a need to act quickly in accordance with our gut reactions. I am not, therefore, arguing that before we can act we have to engage in a never-ending series of academic seminars. But regular thought and discussion on the left about our democratic, humanitarian, libertarian and socialist values will help us to see the wood as well as the trees.

The paradox of Nick Cohen’s stimulating book is that it was in an earlier work of his that he showed us what had taken place within the Labour Party which set back the very processes of thought which I recommend above. Although things were far from perfect beforehand, it was those “Pretty Straight Guys” (Faber and Faber, 2003) around Tony Blair who helped abandon the Labour Party’s traditional ideals. The problem for Nick Cohen is that in “What’s Left?“ he throws away his earlier perceptions along with the murky bathwater which he has now discovered.

When he twigs and produces a synthesis of “What’s Left?” and “Pretty Straight Guys”, it should really be something.

Muslims Against Sectarianism

This is an article from this week's "Soma: An Iraqi Kurdish Digest" which is published in English in Sulaymaniyah in the north of Iraq. It reports on a speech before a mass audience by a Shiite Imam in which he opposes sectarian divisions amongst Shiites, Sunnis and the wider non-Muslim community.

I first read a copy of the Digest in Sulaymaniyah last April and now link into it. Highly recommended.